Remembering Max Weber: What’s Next for Syria?

“Conditions may change, but you cannot eliminate the struggle itself. Nations and states are constantly subject to a process of selection.” – Max Weber, 1895

When Max Weber uttered the above words during his inaugural lecture, he was a young academic in his early 30s. Within a short span of time, he would become a globally recognized figure and one of the founding fathers of sociology.

Starting his education at Heidelberg University, Weber completed his law degree and later pursued his doctoral studies in economics due to his interest in the field, specializing in agricultural economics. During this period, his research report—highlighting how Polish agricultural laborers migrating to East Germany created a cheap labor market, compelling local German farmers to migrate to various German cities—garnered significant attention in academic circles.

Max Weber and International Politics

At the time Weber was preparing this report, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was striving to transform Germany into a regional power in continental Europe. Bismarck believed in the concept of “balance of power” and aimed to protect Germany in potential large-scale wars through an alliance system involving Austria, Italy, and Russia.

While Weber also believed in the balance of power, he approached the concept differently from Bismarck and was critical of his governance style. Weber primarily defined politics as an endless arena of struggle, a perspective he also applied to international relations. While he viewed the state as a progressive force in domestic politics, Weber envisioned a different role for Germany in foreign policy. Unlike Bismarck, he advocated for Germany to become an imperial power and dominate the colonial race, considering the country’s rapid industrialization. [1]

The foundation of Weber’s perspective lay in the concept of great power politics. According to him, while the main cause of war was the struggle for power and prestige among states, competition among great powers added an irrational element to international relations, escalating tensions, armament, and conflicts.

Weber took his analysis a step further, emphasizing Germany’s international responsibility to ensure the survival of smaller states and nations such as Poland, Ukraine, Denmark, and Switzerland. He advocated for the concept of a European (or International) Society, arguing that Germany should act rationally, support the cultures of these countries, and show solidarity with them in the name of European values. [2] By attributing ethical responsibility to power, Weber introduced a new perspective to international relations, which later inspired the English School approach of Hedley Bull and Martin Wight, eventually formalizing the idea as “moral responsibility.”

Max Weber and the State

It is important to note that Max Weber was not an international relations theorist. However, he left an indelible mark on the social sciences by transforming his vast knowledge of history, economics, and sociology into a highly original theory of the state through analytical categories.

Weber centered his focus on the role of the state, creating various dichotomies such as state-international order, state-bureaucracy, state-authority, and state-capitalism. By incorporating different cultural and value systems into his analysis, he historicized and conceptualized the distinction between Eastern and Western types of states.

Aside from his conceptual richness, Weber’s definition of the state, which this article will utilize, remains a staple in introductory political science courses today: “The state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”

State, Bureaucracy, and Capitalism

Weber’s definition of the state as the sole organization holding the monopoly of legitimate physical force also clarifies the concept of state sovereignty. For Weber, the distinctive criterion of a sovereignty relationship is a certain degree of voluntary acceptance—an interest in obedience, whether motivated by implicit incentives or genuine acceptance. [3]

Weber categorized authority into three types based on historical characteristics and forms of societal governance:

Traditional Authority: Rooted in longstanding habits and traditions, often seen in systems like monarchies.
Charismatic Authority: Deriving from the personal charisma, heroism, or inspiring qualities of a leader, often appearing in extraordinary situations or revolutionary periods.
Legal-Rational Authority: Based on written rules, laws, and bureaucratic structures; this type governs modern states and institutions.

Weber emphasized that these forms of authority can shift over time depending on social structures and historical periods. He paid special attention to legal-rational authority, linking it to the emergence of historical capitalism. According to Weber, fundamental elements like the hierarchical structure of bureaucratic organization, clearly defined administrative roles, and systematic discipline in fulfilling responsibilities establish a rational authority equivalent to legal-rational authority. Bureaucratic rationality, therefore, facilitated the rational organization of labor and production in markets, enabling the development of capitalism.

Weber further incorporated the cultural dimension into his analysis, comparing the economic behaviors influenced by Catholic and Protestant ethics. In his seminal 1920 work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber argued that the asceticism, work discipline, and emphasis on wealth accumulation of Protestants in the 16th and 17th centuries distinguished them from other capitalist production models, infusing rationality into the capital accumulation process and shaping the spirit of capitalism.

Understanding Syria through Weber

The 61-year-old Ba’athist regime in Syria was recently toppled. In other words, the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which had long suppressed diverse religious and cultural identities, has come to an end. The Heyat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, led by Muhammad al-Julani—now known as Ahmad al-Shara—emerged victorious and currently oversees Syria’s transitional period.

Using Weber’s framework, this section explores Syria’s past and potential future through a series of questions:

From Weber’s perspective, Syria’s emergence can be seen as a result of great power politics and the imperial competition between France and Britain. Given that the political map of the post-Ottoman Middle East was largely drawn by imperial powers, why didn’t a pan-Arab (International) Society similar to Europe’s emerge in the region?
If such an international society had existed historically, could cooperation and partnership have replaced power politics among Syria and other Arab states? In that scenario, would the 2003 Iraq invasion or the 2011 Arab Spring have occurred?
Could an international society grounded in Arab identity and shared cultural values have prevented sectarian wars or foreign interventions in Syria? In such a scenario, might Egypt or Saudi Arabia have acted with ethical responsibility to protect Syria from becoming a geopolitical target?
Until the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria conformed to Weber’s classical definition of a state. However, it represented an Eastern, despotic state, where the ruler (despot) derived legitimacy from familial, tribal, or traditional ties.
Since 1963, Syria, governed by Ba’athist ideology, exhibited charismatic authority under a despotic state structure. Notably, Hafez al-Assad assumed power through a bloodless coup known as the “Corrective Movement” in 1970, gaining legitimacy through elections the following year. Weber’s insights on charismatic authority are relevant here:
- If a leader fails to consistently achieve success and, more importantly, to benefit their subjects, charismatic power fades.
- Pure charismatic authority cannot endure in a stable form. It must either become traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both.
- Charismatic norms often transform into traditional measures based on patrimonial charisma, leading to a familial or lineage-based state, consolidating interests and powers into a traditional framework.
Both Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar, who took power in 2000, failed to transform Syria into a rational authority or establish a modern bureaucracy. Instead, the existing bureaucracy became a network of interest groups organized around familial ties. This deviation from serving societal interests drove the country into a cycle of oppression and violence, culminating in sectarian conflicts.
The absence of rational bureaucracy hindered the development of modern capitalism. Additionally, the Eastern bourgeoisie was heavily suppressed by the despotic or patriarchal state, and unlike the “free cities” in the West, they were confined to “administrative camps.”
Ultimately, the economic crisis deepened by Syria’s civil war quickly devolved into market failure, paving the way for the rise of various political, economic, and religious power centers. The country became susceptible to foreign interventions, leading to the emergence of groups such as ISIS, the Free Syrian Army (later the Syrian National Army), Hezbollah, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), PYD/YPG, and Al-Nusra (later HTS).
Most of these groups fought relentlessly for 13 years to overthrow the regime. Assad’s refusal to make significant policy changes and his rapid loss of international support led to the collapse of Syria’s bureaucracy. This collapse, combined with the national army’s retreat and surrendering of arms, allowed HTS to seize major Syrian cities, including Damascus, within days.

A Weberian Analysis of the Current Situation

Following the capture of the capital, HTS leader Julani began using his real name, Ahmad al-Shara, and acts as the de facto head of the transitional government. His primary challenge is securing recognition for the new Syrian state and its system of governance.
Shara emerged as the new charismatic leader during an extraordinary period, but maintaining this charismatic authority requires successfully completing the state-building process.
Shara’s pragmatic personality and adaptive nature are evident. His recent statements about disbanding HTS suggest he intends to abandon old practices in governance, but this alone is insufficient for rationalizing the state.
Given Shara’s background, it is likely that he envisions establishing a state with strong Islamic overtones, potentially ushering in a new phase of Eastern despotism.
Despite everything, Shara values relations with the West. His efforts to cultivate genuine ties with Western journalists, media representatives, politicians, and diplomats may have borne fruit. However, the real battle for Shara begins now: rebuilding Syria’s economy. Reconstructing the national economy and sustaining capitalist market relations in Syria will be no easy task. While Shara recognizes the importance of institutions, factors such as religion and the country’s security vulnerabilities pose significant obstacles. Overcoming these challenges could attract Western capital to the country.

In conclusion, it is too early to make definitive judgments about Syria’s future. However, a simple Weberian analysis provides valuable insights into the transitional period or, alternatively, the chaotic phase ahead.

[1] Weber, C., & Lebow, R. N. (2019). Weber and International Relations. Cambridge University Press.

[2] Hobson, J. M. (2020). Decolonizing Weber: The Eurocentrism of Weber’s IR and historical sociology. In R. N. Lebow (Ed.), Max Weber and International Relations (pp. 235–256). Cambridge University Press.

[3] Weber, M. (2013). Bürokrasi ve Otorite (H.Bahadır Akın, Çev.). Adres Yayınları.

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